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INTRODUCTION 
On April 20, 2010, an explosion at BP p.l.c.’s (“BP”) Deepwater Hori-
zon oil rig (the “Rig”) caused a massive oil gush 5000 feet below sea level, 
resulting in the largest environmental disaster in United States history and 
the largest oil-related disaster in the world.1  As a result of the explosion, 
eleven workers were killed, seventeen others were seriously injured,2 and 
thousands more in the Gulf area suffered, and continue to suffer, financial 
losses.  The extensive scope of the injuries and economic losses has led to 
 
 1. David J. Cook, Class Actions and the Limits of Recovery: The Glass Jaw of Justice 
(Part 1 of 2), J. LEGAL. TECH. RISK MGMT., Fall 2010, at 1. 
 2. Verified Amended Shareholder Derivative Complaint at 53, Lampers v. Hayward, 
No. 2:10-cv-01446 (E.D. La. Aug. 19, 2010), ECF No. 58. 
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the filing of thousands of claims and hundreds of class actions against BP 
and other potentially responsible parties for economic damages, environ-
mental cleanup costs, and other losses.3  BP insiders, including Anthony B. 
Hayward, the former Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”) of BP and former 
Executive Director of the Board of Directors, face numerous derivative lia-
bility suits for breach of fiduciary duties to the company and its sharehold-
ers.4  Transocean Ltd., the company that owned and operated the Rig, 
which it leased to BP, also faces liability for the disaster.5  In addition, Ca-
meron International Corporation (“Cameron”), the company that manufac-
tured the blowout preventer that failed to function on the Rig, is confronted 
with potential liability.6  Lastly, Halliburton Energy Services, Inc. (“Halli-
burton”), a subcontractor to the Rig and the company that was servicing the 
cement casing meant to seal the wellhead to the sea floor, faces extensive 
liability claims for its part in the disaster.7 
In response to the onslaught of claims and pressure from President Ob-
ama, BP agreed to place $20 billion into an escrow account (the “BP Oil 
Spill Fund” or “Fund”) to pay damage claims.8  Claimants who choose to 
recover from the BP Oil Spill Fund must, in exchange for compensation, 
waive their rights to pursue claims against both BP and others, including 
Halliburton and Cameron.9  The question arises: is it fair to release BP 
from liability in exchange for its contribution of $20 billion? 
Some argue that without the BP Oil Spill Fund, BP would be embroiled 
in litigation with tort claimants for years to come, and the success of the 
company would be severely in question.  The Fund also enables claimants 
to be compensated far more quickly than they otherwise would be if they 
were required to obtain a judgment in court.  For many Gulf residents, re-
ceiving compensation now is imperative, as they cannot afford to wait for 
their claims to take the inevitably lengthy route through the traditional judi-
cial system.  While the Fund offers several benefits, with BP paying the 
vast majority of these claims, what justification can there be for releasing 
BP’s insiders, Halliburton, and others from liability? 
Although BP did not enter bankruptcy, the BP Oil Spill Fund and the 
proposed releases of BP, BP’s insiders, and other potentially liable compa-
 
 3. Cook, supra note 1, at 1; Stephen Gidiere et al., The Coming Wave of Gulf Coast Oil 
Spill Litigation, 71 ALA. LAW. 374, 379 (Sept. 2010). 
 4. See Verified Amended Shareholder Derivative Complaint, supra note 2, at 9-10. 
 5. See id. at 17. 
 6. See id. 
 7. See id. 
 8. Jackie Calmes & Helene Cooper, BP to Set Aside $20 Billion To Help Oil Spill Vic-
tims, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2010, at A18. 
 9. Cook, supra note 1, at 2; Gidiere et al., supra note 3. 
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nies parallel many of the issues faced by bankruptcy courts assessing Chap-
ter 11 plans.  Bankruptcy courts have long struggled with the question of 
whether a Chapter 11 plan can contain a provision releasing the liabilities 
of, or grant injunctions preventing claims from being asserted against, par-
ties other than the debtor, including insiders of the debtor and others enti-
ties tangentially related to the debtor, namely insurance companies.10 
This Note will argue that the power of bankruptcy courts to grant non-
debtor third party releases and injunctions should be carefully limited.  As 
the BP case illustrates, there are significant benefits to the creation of a 
claimants trust, both for the company and claimants.  Claimants trusts most 
often arise in the bankruptcy context in cases where the debtor faces mass 
tort claims or securities class actions.11  In these cases, the debtor’s insurer 
often agrees to make a contribution to the fund or to channel proceeds of 
the insurance policy into a fund in exchange for a release from future liabil-
ity and an injunction barring future action by claimants against the insurer.  
This Note will argue that bankruptcy courts should continue to grant re-
leases and injunctions in exchange for the insurer’s substantial contribution 
to the plan of reorganization when the debtor is faced with class action or 
mass tort litigation that threatens to upend any efforts to reorganize the 
debtor.  The insurer’s contribution to a claimants trust can aid the debtor’s 
reorganization because the debtor can avoid time-consuming litigation with 
the insurer over the scope of the insurance policy, the cost of which would 
deplete assets of the estate.  These assets will instead be available to credi-
tors.  Insurer releases and injunctions in exchange for channeling insurance 
proceeds into a fund may further promote the fair and equitable distribution 
of assets to creditors because the proceeds will be distributed under the su-
pervision of the bankruptcy court, as opposed to the state law rule of first-
come, first-served that leaves some creditors paid in full and others with 
little or no compensation. 
Recent developments in the Chapter 11 process have important implica-
tions for whether courts should grant releases to another type of nondebtor 
third party—insiders of the debtor.12  In the past, many courts were willing 
to grant insider releases or injunctions based on various theories, including 
the need to obtain the insider’s assistance and cooperation with the reorgan-
ization, the debtor’s need to obtain the release of the insider’s indemnity or 
contribution claims against the debtor, and the need to secure monetary 
contributions from the insider to the plan of reorganization.13  This Note 
 
 10. See infra Part II.A. 
 11. See cases cited infra note 198 and accompanying text. 
 12. See discussion infra Part III.B. 
 13. See discussion infra Part II.B.1. 
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will argue that recent shifts towards pre-arranged bankruptcies and the in-
creased use of turnaround specialists render at least two of these justifica-
tions moot.14  These changes to the traditional Chapter 11 proceeding indi-
cate that large corporate debtors do not view existing management as 
integral to the reorganization of the debtor, and that it is, therefore, unne-
cessary to provide the insiders with releases or permanent injunctions.  Se-
curing existing management’s cooperation and assistance is no longer, and 
may never have been, a valid reason for granting a release or an injunc-
tion.15  In addition, since corporations more and more frequently replace 
existing management, the need to grant a release in exchange for the insid-
er’s contribution of new value to induce the insider to retain an equity in-
terest in the reorganized entity is also no longer a valid justification.16  
Lastly, as some commentators have argued, the debtor’s need to obtain re-
leases from insiders’ indemnification and contribution claims is an illusory 
argument that courts have too often accepted without question.17 
This Note proceeds in three parts.  Part I addresses the history of non-
debtor releases and injunctions, the origins of bankruptcy courts’ jurisdic-
tional powers, the traditional and more unique ways in which bankruptcy 
courts interpret and exercise this power, and the policy goals behind Chap-
ter 11.  Part II explores seminal decisions on whether bankruptcy courts 
have the power to grant nondebtor third party releases and injunctions.  It 
also lays out the main arguments asserted by both courts and scholars on 
both sides of the argument.  Lastly, Part III sets forth my argument that 
courts should never grant permanent releases to insiders and only under 
rare circumstances, to the debtor’s insurers. 
I.  THE HISTORY OF NONDEBTOR RELEASES AND INJUNCTIONS 
In a Chapter 11 bankruptcy, one of the main policy goals includes suc-
cessful reorganization of a debtor with going concern value and fair and 
equitable distribution to creditors.18  Deciding when a debtor has going 
concern value is a matter left to the court’s discretion.  Some argue that the 
 
 14. See discussion infra Part III.B. 
 15. See discussion infra Part III.B.1. 
 16. See discussion infra Part III.B.2. 
 17. See discussion infra Part III.B.3. 
 18. See, e.g., Barry L. Zaretsky, Insurance Proceeds in Bankruptcy, 55 BROOK. L. REV. 
373, 377 (1989) [hereinafter Zaretsky, Insurance Proceeds] (explaining that Chapter 11 
aims to maximize the amount that creditors recover and to distribute assets among creditors 
equally).  Additional policy goals also exist. See H.R. REP. NO. 595, at 220 (1977), reprinted 
in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6179 (legislative history shows that Congress intended the 
Code to enable reorganization of the debtor so that it could continue to employ its workers, 
satisfy its debts to creditors, and yield a return to shareholders). 
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assets of firms with revenues falling below nonfinancing costs should be 
sold off because the assets are better put to use elsewhere.19  Insolvent 
firms with revenues in excess of production costs, but that are unable to 
pay the firm’s debt, should continue as going concerns.20  The capital struc-
ture of the firm should be restructured to allow the firm to function under 
less leverage.21 
Issues arise because individual creditors have the incentive to attempt to 
grab assets of the firm—to liquidate the firm piecemeal—in order to satisfy 
their own claims.22  This incentive is present whether or not it is more effi-
cient to reorganize the firm.23  As a group, however, creditors have the in-
centive to allow the firm to reorganize when it will result in greater value 
than would result from liquidation.24  The bankruptcy system attempts to 
solve this coordination problem among creditors through mechanisms that 
disable creditors from racing to collect on their individual claims and also 
determine the means of producing the most value from the firm, either 
through reorganization or through liquidation.25 
A. Basics of a Chapter 11 Proceeding 
This Note will focus on Chapter 11 reorganizations; therefore, a cursory 
explanation of the bankruptcy process under this title may be of use.  Un-
like a Chapter 7 case, in which the debtor’s assets are liquidated and 
proceeds are distributed to its creditors on a pro rata basis,26 a debtor in 
Chapter 11 continues to operate while attempting to reorganize itself.27  
Creditor claims will be satisfied under the reorganization plan typically 
through current assets as well as future earnings of the reorganized deb-
tor.28 
 
 19. Alan Schwartz, A Contract Theory Approach to Business Bankruptcy, 107 YALE L.J. 
1807, 1807 (1998).  This is often referred to as “piecemeal liquidation.” See Barry E. Adler, 
A Theory of Corporate Insolvency, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 343, 360 n.62 (1997). 
 20. See Schwartz, supra note 19. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 1807-09 (“Business bankruptcy systems attempt to solve a coordination prob-
lem for the creditors of insolvent firms.”); see also Zaretsky, Insurance Proceeds, supra 
note 18, at 377-78 (explaining that the collective nature of bankruptcy proceedings avoids a 
race to the debtor’s assets that results in some creditors being paid in full and some creditors 
receiving only partial or no payment on their debts). 
 26. See Zaretsky, Insurance Proceeds, supra note 18, at 377. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
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1. Bankruptcy Courts’ Traditional Exercise of Jurisdiction Under 
Chapter 11 
Upon filing of the petition, the debtor’s legal and equitable interests be-
come property of the estate.29  The Bankruptcy Code’s definition of proper-
ty of the estate is intentionally broad.30  Congress wanted to give the bank-
ruptcy trustee control over as much of the debtor’s assets as possible in 
order to maximize the assets available for distribution to creditors.31  The 
definition of property of the estate is also intentionally broad in order to 
bring property that is best administered in a collective proceeding into the 
estate.32 
In addition, a stay is instituted that prevents actions against the debtor 
and against the property of the estate for the duration of the proceeding.33  
This automatic stay provides the debtor with “a breathing spell from his 
creditors.”34  It also helps to ensure the equitable distribution of the deb-
tor’s assets among creditors. 
The automatic stay contemplates actions against the debtor and the prop-
erty of the estate; therefore, co-debtors or other third party debtors are gen-
erally not given protection under this provision.35  Because the automatic 
stay does not protect these parties, claimants often attempt to collect from 
these entities when they are prevented from pursuing the debtor.36  In these 
instances, the bankruptcy court exercises a less traditional jurisdictional 
power, explored in Part I.A.2, by drawing on its section 105 powers, which 
give the court the power to take any action “necessary or appropriate” to 
carry out the provisions of the Code.37 
Another benefit to a debtor of Chapter 11 is that upon confirmation of 
the plan, section 1141(d)(1) discharges the debtor from any debt that arose 
 
 29. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (2006) (debtor’s estate includes “all legal or equitable inter-
ests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case”). 
 30. H.R. REP. NO. 595, at 367 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963. 
 31. Id. at 175-76. 
 32. See Zaretsky, Insurance Proceeds, supra note 18, at 387-88.  As discussed below, 
the definition of property of the estate has great impact on the position of third party non-
debtors. See infra notes 169-174 and accompanying text.  For example, disagreement as to 
whether insurance proceeds are considered “property of the estate” has implications for 
whether the bankruptcy court has power over the property in order to distribute the proceeds 
to creditors. See Zaretsky, Insurance Proceeds, supra note 18, at 378-79. 
 33. See 11 U.S.C. § 362. 
 34. H.R. REP. NO. 595, at 340. 
 35. 11 U.S.C. § 362; see Barry L. Zaretsky, Co-Debtor Stays in Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, 
73 CORNELL L. REV. 213, 217 (1988) [hereinafter Zaretsky, Co-Debtor Stays] (explaining 
that by its language, section 362 applies only to debtors). 
 36. See Zaretsky, Insurance Proceeds, supra note 18, at 383. 
 37. See 11 U.S.C. § 105. 
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before the date of the confirmation.38  This is a powerful tool for the debtor 
because the statute indicates that claims are dischargeable whether or not 
proof of claim is filed, the claim is allowed, or the claimant has voted in fa-
vor of the plan.39  In addition to requesting temporary stays, analogous to 
the automatic stay provided to the debtor, nondebtor third parties some-
times also request permanent injunctions or releases, similar to the dis-
charge provided to debtors under section 1141(d)(1).  However, because 
the language of section 1141(d)(1) refers only to debtors, bankruptcy courts 
must find their power to grant permanent injunctions on behalf of nondeb-
tor third parties elsewhere in the Bankruptcy Code.  The justifications used 
by bankruptcy courts to extend permanent injunctions and releases to non-
debtor third parties vary greatly and are discussed in the next section. 
2. Bankruptcy Courts’ Equitable Powers Under Section 105 
Bankruptcy courts may exercise control over property that is not consi-
dered “property of the estate” and is, therefore, not covered by the section 
362 automatic stay.  A trustee or debtor may seek an injunction under the 
court’s section 105 equitable powers.40  There are two types of injunctions 
under section 105, temporary41 and permanent.42 
Section 105 gives bankruptcy courts the power to enact discretionary 
stays.43  Unlike the automatic stay, a request for relief under section 105 
must typically meet the traditional requirements for an injunction.44  Courts 
will consider whether the party seeking a preliminary injunction is likely to 
succeed on the merits, whether irreparable harm is likely if preliminary re-
lief is denied, whether the balance of equities tips in the moving party’s fa-
vor, and whether the injunction is in the public interest.45  The court need 
not consider all of the factors; if one is particularly strong, the court may 
 
 38. 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(1) (granting discharge to debtors that are not individuals). 
 39. 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1141.05 (16th ed. 2009). 
 40. See 11 U.S.C. § 105 (a bankruptcy court may take any action “necessary or appro-
priate” to effect the provisions of the Code); COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 39, ¶ 
105.04 (“The most notorious use of section 105 has been to seek to enjoin actions which, for 
one reason or another, are not stayed by the automatic stay of section 362.”). 
 41. Temporary injunctions are also referred to as “preconfirmation injunctions” or 
“temporary stays.” 
 42. Permanent injunctions are also referred to as “postconfirmation injunctions.”  It is 
important to note that in the context of Chapter 11 cases, the injunction is typically tempo-
rary, meaning it carries on only for the duration of the bankruptcy proceeding. See Zaretsky, 
Insurance Proceeds, supra note 18, at 400. 
 43. COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 39, ¶ 105.03. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
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issue or deny an injunction based upon that factor alone.46  Some courts 
have reformulated this traditional test to comport with the language of sec-
tion 105 by removing the factors relating to irreparable harm and lack of an 
adequate remedy at law.47  The revised test requires that there be: first, a 
danger of irreparable harm to the estate or the debtor’s ability to reorgan-
ize; second, a reasonable likelihood of reorganization; third, a balance of 
the relative harm between the debtor and the creditor who would be re-
strained; and fourth, consideration of whether the injunction is in the public 
interest.48 
For permanent injunctions, the tests that courts employ also vary.  Some 
courts ask if the injunction requested is “necessary or appropriate to carry 
out” the discharge provisions of Chapter 11.49  Other courts approve releas-
es only if the affected creditors and parties consent.50  One of the most au-
thoritative tests, the Master Mortgage test, includes five factors: first, there 
must be an identity of interest between the debtor and the third party such 
that a suit against the third party is, in essence, a suit against the debtor or 
will deplete assets of the estate; second, the third party must contribute 
“substantial assets” to the reorganization; third, the success of the plan 
must hinge on granting the release; fourth, a substantial majority of the 
creditors must agree to the release; and finally, the plan must provide for 
payment of all or substantially all of the claims of the classes affected by 
the third party release.51 
There are definite limits to courts’ section 105 powers.  A Chapter 11 
plan of reorganization may only be confirmed if the court finds it complies 
with all provisions of the Code;52 therefore, a court cannot confirm a plan 
containing a third party discharge unless it conforms with all applicable 
provisions.  Thus, as the Supreme Court has held: “[W]hatever equitable 
powers remain in the bankruptcy courts must and can only be exercised 
within the confines of the Bankruptcy Code.”53  Although bankruptcy 
courts are courts of equity, the power to issue injunctive relief under sec-
tion 105 is limited to matters within the confines of the Code.54 
 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id.; see, e.g., In re Monroe Well Serv., Inc., 67 B.R. 746, 752-54 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 
1986). 
 49. 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2006); COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 39, ¶ 105.04. 
 50. See, e.g., In re DBSD N. Am., Inc. 419 B.R. 179 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 51. See In re Master Mortg. Inv. Fund, Inc., 168 B.R. 930, 936 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1994). 
 52. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(1). 
 53. Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 206 (1988). 
 54. See Howard C. Buschman III, The Power and Propriety of Bankruptcy Court Inter-
vention in Actions Between Nondebtors, 47 BUS. LAW 913, 922 (1992). 
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B. Which Nondebtor Third Parties Request Releases and 
Injunctions? 
When a debtor files a Chapter 11 petition, various parties associated with 
the debtor seek the benefits of the bankruptcy proceeding, including tempo-
rary and permanent injunctions and releases.  Nondebtor third parties in the 
bankruptcy context consist mainly of insiders of the debtor and the debtor’s 
insurers.  Insiders of the debtor, including directors and officers, often seek 
protection from the bankruptcy courts even though they themselves have 
not filed for bankruptcy.55  A debtor’s insurers will frequently seek releases 
or injunctions in exchange for contributions to the plan or, in the case of a 
bankruptcy precipitated by mass tort claims, a trust upon which the tort 
claimants may draw.56 
II.  SEMINAL DECISIONS AND REASONS FOR AND AGAINST NONDEBTOR 
THIRD PARTY RELEASES AND INJUNCTIONS 
This part explores the seminal decisions of both “pro-release” and “anti-
release” courts.  Since the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction is limited by sta-
tute,57 pro-release courts rely on several provisions in the Bankruptcy 
Code58 and the Bankruptcy Rules59 in approving Chapter 11 plans contain-
ing these releases and injunctions.  Anti-release courts point instead to a 
provision of the Bankruptcy Code that states, “[D]ischarge of a debt of the 
 
 55. See, e.g., SEC v. Drexel Burnham Lambert Grp., Inc. (In re Drexel Burnham Lam-
bert Grp., Inc.), 130 B.R. 910, 913-14 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), aff’d, 960 F.2d 285 (2d Cir. 1992) 
(allowing releases of most of the securities claims asserted against debtor’s directors and 
officers). 
 56. See, e.g., Menard-Sanford v. Mabey (In re A. H. Robins Co.), 880 F.2d 694 (4th Cir. 
1989); MacArthur Co. v. Johns-Manville Corp. (In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 837 F.2d 89, 
91 (2d Cir. 1988). 
 57. See 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (2006). 
 58. As discussed supra in Part I.A.2, the courts use their equitable powers under section 
105 of the Bankruptcy Code. See 11 U.S.C. § 105 (2006) (“The court may issue any order, 
process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this 
title.”).  In addition, pro-release courts rely on section 1123(b)(6), which, like section 105, 
has been construed to broaden the courts jurisdictional power. See 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(6) 
(2006).  In laying out contents of a plan, this provision states, “[s]ubject to subsection (a) of 
this section, a plan may—(6) include any other appropriate provision not inconsistent with 
the applicable provisions of this title.” Id. 
 59. Pro-release courts point to Bankruptcy Rule 3016(c) as support that Congress con-
templated bankruptcy courts’ exercising jurisdiction over nondebtor releases and injunc-
tions.  FED. R. BANKR. P. 3016(c) (stating that if a plan provides for an injunction not specif-
ically authorized in the Code, such provision and the affected parties must be identified in 
the plan and disclosure statement). 
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debtor does not affect the liability of any other entity on, or the property of 
any other entity for, such debt.”60 
Part II then discusses the reasons that have been asserted by courts and 
scholars for and against granting releases to insiders61 and debtors’ insur-
ers.62 
A. Judicial Disagreement on the Treatment of Nondebtor Third 
Party Releases and Injunctions in Chapter 11 Plans 
Courts are divided on whether bankruptcy courts have the power to grant 
nondebtor third party releases and injunctions.63  Although some circuits 
have shown more willingness than others to grant nondebtor third party re-
leases, there is not a strict divide.  The Second Circuit, for example, has 
produced some of the most creative solutions to settling mass tort litigation 
in bankruptcy by granting permanent releases and injunctions to nondebtor 
third parties.64  On the other hand, the Second Circuit has criticized releases 
to nondebtor third parties in at least one case because the bankruptcy court 
failed to find that the release was essential to the success of the plan.65  
This tension, even within each circuit, is instructive.  Far from being con-
tradictory, these varying opinions indicate that the courts are struggling to 
articulate a seamless policy that underlies their decisions in varying cir-
cumstances to grant or deny releases to nondebtor third parties.  Part III 
will attempt to elucidate this underlying policy; but first, some of the se-
minal decisions in this area of law are discussed. 
1. Seminal Pro-Release Decisions 
Pro-release courts reason that section 105 grants bankruptcy courts 
equitable powers, and that these powers are not constrained by the lan-
 
 60. 11 U.S.C. § 524(e). 
 61. See infra Part II.B.1. 
 62. See infra Part II.B.2. 
 63. Compare SEC v. Drexel Burnham Lambert Grp., Inc. (In re Drexel Burnham Lam-
bert Grp., Inc.), 960 F.2d 285, 293 (2d Cir. 1992) (approving bankruptcy courts’ power to 
grant injunction to nondebtor third party), with Resorts Int’l, Inc. v. Lowenschuss (In re 
Lowenschuss), 67 F.3d 1394, 1401 (9th Cir. 1995) (explaining that the Ninth Circuit has 
repeatedly held that bankruptcy courts do not have the power to discharge the liabilities of 
nondebtor third parties). 
 64. See MacArthur Co. v. Johns-Manville Corp. (In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 837 F.2d 
89, 91 (2d Cir. 1988). 
 65. See Deutsche Bank AG v. Metromedia Fiber Network, Inc. (In re Metromedia Fiber 
Network, Inc.), 416 F.3d 136, 143 (2d Cir. 2005) (affirming confirmation regardless of this 
oversight because the appeal was equitably moot as no stay of the confirmation order was 
obtained). 
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guage of section 524(e) so long as the enjoining of claims is essential to the 
reorganization of the debtor.66  It is important to note, however, that the 
more permissive views of the Second and Fourth Circuits discussed below 
have not generally been construed by courts to give them “unfettered dis-
cretion to discharge non-debtors from liability.”67 
a. In re Johns-Manville Corp. 
One of the leading pro-release decisions comes from the Second Cir-
cuit.68  Johns-Manville Corporation (“Johns-Manville” or “Manville”) pro-
duced products containing asbestos and faced numerous product liability 
lawsuits by asbestos health claimants.69  Manville believed that its insur-
ance would indemnify it against asbestos liability and defense costs, but 
Manville’s insurers disagreed, launching Manville into costly litigation 
with its insurers over the scope of the policies.70  This litigation, in addition 
to several large liability awards and studies estimating that Manville faced 
$1.9 billion in liability from over 52,000 asbestos claims, led Manville to 
file for Chapter 11.71 
In the plan of reorganization, Manville’s insurance companies agreed to 
pay $770 million in exchange for releases from future liability and an in-
junction against all future suits.72  Claims were not extinguished, but rather 
were channeled into a trust for successful claimants.73  The court relied in 
part on section 363(f), which permits the sale of estate property “free and 
clear” of any third party interest such as a lien in certain circumstances.74  
The court reasoned that the insurance policies belonged to the estate, and 
thus that section 363(f) allowed the court to dispose of the insurance 
 
 66. See, e.g, In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Grp., Inc., 960 F.2d at 293 (“In bankruptcy 
cases, a court may enjoin a creditor from suing a third party, provided the injunction plays 
an important part in the debtor’s reorganization plan.”); Menard-Sanford v. Mabey (In re A. 
H. Robins Co.), 880 F.2d 694, 702 (4th Cir. 1989). 
 67. See LTV Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 167 B.R. 776, 
780 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (noting that bankruptcy courts have granted permanent injunctions to 
nondebtor third parties only when essential to plan confirmation). 
 68. See Johns-Manville Corp., 837 F.2d 89. 
 69. See Zaretsky, Insurance Proceeds, supra note 18, at 405 n.77 (citing Johns-Manville 
Corp., 837 F.2d at 91) (approximately 17,000 suits were pending against Manville by 1982). 
 70. See Zaretsky, Insurance Proceeds, supra note 18, at 405. 
 71. Id. at 405-06. 
 72. Johns-Manville Corp., 837 F.2d at 90. 
 73. Id. at 91. 
 74. Id. at 93-94; see also 11 U.S.C. § 363(f) (2006) (outlining the circumstances under 
which the trustee may sell property of the estate “free and clear of any interest in such prop-
erty of an entity other than the estate”). 
GAMBLE_CHRISTENSEN 4/9/2011  8:17 PM 
2011] NONDEBTOR RELEASES 833 
proceeds through the settlement trusts and channel the claims to the 
trusts.75 
b. In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc. 
In the bankruptcy of Drexel Burnham Lambert Group (“Drexel Burn-
ham” or “Drexel”), the Second Circuit allowed releases of most of the se-
curities claims against the debtor’s directors and officers.76  The Securities 
and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) had filed a civil enforcement action 
against Drexel Burnham and several of its high-level employees, including 
Michael Milken (“Milken”), head of the High Yield and Convertible Bond 
Department, based on massive securities fraud allegations stemming from 
illegal activities of Milken and other Drexel employees in the junk bond 
market.77  Drexel Burnham agreed to settle the SEC action by paying $350 
million into a civil disgorgement fund, which would be used to satisfy the 
securities claims.78  Milken also agreed to settle the SEC action by paying 
$400 million into the fund.79  Drexel’s plan of reorganization released Mil-
ken and approximately two hundred other employees from all personal lia-
bility.80  As part of the plan confirmation, creditors filing claims against 
Drexel for securities law violations were certified as a class.81  The securi-
ties litigation claimants were not provided with an option to opt out of the 
settlement.82  In approving the settlement, the lower court reasoned that es-
timating the claims could take years, deplete the estate’s assets, and burden 
the court system, and that without the settlement “there could be no Plan 
and indeed, no successful and prompt resolution of these Chapter 11 cas-
es.”83  The court also reasoned that the settlement would facilitate coopera-
tion between the debtor and its employees, induce the debtor’s directors 
and officers to settle certain claims with the debtors, which would provide 
 
 75. Johns-Manville Corp., 837 F.2d at 94 (noting that it was not exactly the same, but 
“the underlying principle of preserving the debtor’s estate for the creditors and funneling 
claims to one proceeding in the bankruptcy court remains the same”). 
 76. SEC v. Drexel Burnham Lambert Grp., Inc. (In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Grp., 
Inc.), 960 F.2d 285 (2d Cir. 1992). 
 77. Id. at 287-88; SEC v. Drexel Burnham Lambert Grp., Inc. (In re Drexel Burnham 
Lambert Grp., Inc.), 130 B.R. 910, 913 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), aff’d, 960 F.2d 285 (2d Cir. 1992); 
see also Ralph Brubaker, Bankruptcy Injunctions and Complex Litigation: A Critical Reap-
praisal of Non-Debtor Releases in Chapter 11 Reorganizations, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 959, 
961-62 (1997) [hereinafter Brubaker, Bankruptcy Injunctions]. 
 78. Drexel Burnham Lambert Grp., Inc., 130 B.R. at 913. 
 79. Id. 
 80. See Brubaker, Bankruptcy Injunctions, supra note 77, at 962-63. 
 81. Drexel Burnham Lambert Grp., Inc., 130 B.R. at 912, 923-24. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 926-27. 
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more funds for the reorganization, eliminate competition over particular as-
sets, and protect the debtor’s estate by preventing indemnity claims that in-
siders would assert if they were sued by the securities claimants.84  On ap-
peal, the Second Circuit affirmed the lower court’s holding, stating that “in 
bankruptcy cases, a court may enjoin a creditor from suing a third party, 
provided the injunction plays an important part in the debtor’s reorganiza-
tion plan.”85  The court reasoned that the settlement “is unquestionably an 
essential element of Drexel’s ultimate reorganization” because without it 
the officers and directors were unlikely to settle.86  Despite Milken’s con-
tributions to the settlement fund, Milken retained substantial personal 
wealth.87  In 2009, Milken ranked 158th on the Forbes list of the 400 rich-
est Americans, with a net worth of approximately $2 billion.88 
c. In re A. H. Robins Co. 
The Fourth Circuit granted releases to various nondebtor third parties in 
the bankruptcy of the A. H. Robins Company (“A. H. Robins” or “Rob-
ins”).89  A. H. Robins manufactured the Dalkon Shield, a birth control de-
vice that was found to cause serious injuries to women who used it.  In re-
sponse to mounting litigation, A. H. Robins filed a Chapter 11 petition.  A 
number of parties were potentially jointly liable with A. H. Robins, includ-
ing the officers and directors responsible for the company’s misconduct, 
and Aetna Casualty and Surety Company (“Aetna”), the company’s prod-
 
 84. Joshua M. Silverstein, Hiding in Plain View: A Neglected Supreme Court Decision 
Resolves the Debate Over Non-Debtor Releases in Chapter 11 Reorganizations, 23 EMORY 
BANKR. DEV. J. 13, 69 (2006). 
 85. SEC v. Drexel Burnham Lambert Grp., Inc. (In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Grp., 
Inc.), 960 F.2d 285, 293 (2d Cir. 1992). 
 86. Id.  This test, asking whether the release or injunction is essential to the reorganiza-
tion of the debtor, is controlling in the Second Circuit.  It is less demanding than the often-
cited Master Mortgage test. See In re Master Mortg. Inv. Fund, Inc., 168 B.R. 930 (Bankr. 
W.D. Mo. 1994); see also supra text accompanying note 51. 
 87. See Brubaker, Bankruptcy Injunctions, supra note 77, at 998 n.139. 
 88. See The 400 Richest Americans, FORBES.COM (Sept. 9, 2009), http://www.forbes. 
com/lists/2009/54/rich-list-09_Michael-Milken_SSM6.html. 
 89. In re A. H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1989); see also Ralph Brubaker, 
Nondebtor Releases and Injunctions in Chapter 11: Revisiting Jurisdictional Precepts and 
the Forgotten Callaway v. Benton Case, 72 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 5 (1998) [hereinafter Bru-
baker, Nondebtor Releases] (explaining that nondebtor releases even precluded injured 
women from suing their doctors for medical malpractice claims). 
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uct liability insurer.90  The court granted a temporary injunction preventing 
suits against these parties during the course of the reorganization.91 
The plan had to take into account approximately 195,000 eligible claims, 
not including future claims.92  Future claimants, though a larger issue in the 
asbestos industry, also had to be contended with in the A. H. Robins case.  
Approximately 3.6 million women used the Dalkon Shield worldwide, 
many of them in Third World countries where Robins had not published 
notices urging removal of the devices.93 
Aetna’s potential liability was not limited to the remaining coverage un-
der the insurance policies.94  Aetna was alleged to have conspired with 
Robins to destroy documents that indicated that Robins knew of dangers 
associated with the Dalkon Shield well before Robins finally warned doc-
tors.95  It was also alleged that Aetna had commissioned and then con-
cealed the results of studies questioning the safety of the Dalkon Shield.96  
Lastly, some allegations arose that Aetna had played a major role in decid-
ing not to issue a recall because it knew doing so would increase the num-
ber and value of Dalkon Shield injury claims.97  Women injured by the 
Dalkon Shield, therefore, filed suit against Aetna on a theory of joint liabil-
ity, claiming that their injuries could have been avoided by a prompt recall 
of the device or a disclosure of the relevant facts.98 
 
 90. RICHARD B. SOBOL, BENDING THE LAW: THE STORY OF THE DALKON SHIELD BANK-
RUPTCY 63 (1991). 
 91. Id. at 63-64. (“The primary reason put forward for this request was that the claims 
against third parties were actually claims against Robins’s assets, either because the judg-
ments would be satisfied through unused product liability insurance (Robins’s officers and 
directors were insured persons under the company’s agreement with Aetna) or because Rob-
ins’s [sic] was contractually obligated to indemnify (reimburse) its officers and directors for 
any liability imposed against them.  Robins’s unused product liability insurance was an asset 
of the estate, and if Dalkon Shield claimants could be paid out of insurance proceeds during 
the bankruptcy, there would be unequal treatment of similarly situated creditors in violation 
of one of the basic precepts of bankruptcy law.  And even apart from the insurance, judg-
ments against Robins’s officers and directors that resulted in claims for indemnity against 
the company provided a mechanism for the liquidation of some Dalkon Shield injury claims 
but not others outside the bankruptcy process.”). 
 92. Id. at 106. 
 93. Id. at 107. 
 94. Id. at 116. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id.  In prebankruptcy cases, Aetna either settled with claimants or the cases were 
dismissed before trial on the narrow ground that an insurer does not owe a duty to consum-
ers to disclose defects in the products it insures. Id.  However, these did not address the oth-
er reasons for potential liability. Id. 
 98. Id. 
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Although Aetna maintained that it had no responsibility for the Dalkon 
Shield injuries, the allegations were distressing to Aetna because they ex-
posed Aetna to potential liability once Robins’ liability was discharged.99  
Aetna was therefore willing to contribute to a fund to compensate Dalkon 
Shield victims in exchange for protection from future liability.  Aetna 
agreed to pay $75 million in cash into a trust for the benefit of Dalkon 
Shield victims.100  In addition, in exchange for a release from future liabili-
ty, Aetna was willing to write two insurance policies: first, $100 million in 
outlier insurance; and second, $250 million in excess insurance in the event 
the trust was unable to pay all claims from the initial $75 million.101 
In the Robins case, the issue arose as to whether tort claimants must be 
given an opt-out provision that would let them waive any recovery from the 
trust and bring their claims directly.  Aetna was not opposed to a proposed 
settlement that allowed claimants to opt out and pursue Aetna directly be-
cause the settlement would preclude the recovery of punitive damages, the-
reby reducing the intensity of the Dalkon Shield litigation.102  In addition, 
the claimants trust would take care of most of the litigation, decreasing the 
frequency of claims.103 
The Robins case also dealt with the issue of whether insiders of the deb-
tor could be granted releases from all future liability.  Although legal pro-
ceedings related to A. H. Robins and Dalkon Shield had been stayed, one 
proceeding, an investigation by the Department of Justice into possible 
criminal activity by A. H. Robins’ officers and directors had not.  A district 
judge denied a motion by Robins to quash a subpoena issued by a grand 
jury, explaining that there was substantial evidence that “Robins and its 
employees and officers participated in the commission of crimes and fraud 
during the promotion, marketing and sale of the Dalkon Shield, and used its 
attorneys to perpetuate and cover-up [this conduct] through the commission 
of frauds on the court, obstruction of justice, and perjury.”104  Since the 
standard of proof is lower for civil liability, the officers and directors of 
Robins were rightfully concerned that they would face liability once the 
company was discharged.105  As part of the plan of reorganization, Robins 
was to merge with a subsidiary of American Home Products, and the Rob-
 
 99. Id. at 117. 
 100. In re A. H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 709, 722 (4th Cir. 1989). 
 101. Id. 
 102. See SOBOL, supra note 90, at 218-19.  The settlement depended on the judge’s wil-
lingness to certify a mandatory class for punitive damages. Id. at 250. 
 103. Id. at 219. 
 104. Id. at 220. 
 105. Id. 
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ins family was expected to receive over $300 million in American Home 
Products stock, so there would be assets from which claimants could re-
cover.106  Although the insiders maintained that they were not liable, under 
the settlement agreement, two members of the Robins family, both of 
whom held senior management positions, agreed to personally make a 
combined payment of $10 million to the trust in exchange for an injunction 
and full release from all future tort liability.107  Although the claimants 
committee was not pleased with the release, they decided to accept it be-
cause the value of the overall agreement with American Home Products 
was worth it.108 
In approving the plan, the court reasoned that the release was essential to 
reorganization because it required the debtor to be free from indemnity and 
contribution lawsuits that third parties would have brought had they been 
sued by Dalkon Shield claimants.  Creditors voted overwhelmingly in favor 
of the plan, the plan provided Dalkon Shield claimants with the opportunity 
to receive payment in full, and Aetna made substantial contributions to the 
plan.109  Although the Fourth Circuit noted that the contribution of $10 mil-
lion by the Robins family was only “minimal,” it still affirmed the settle-
ment.110 
2. Seminal Anti-Release Decisions 
Many courts refuse to approve Chapter 11 plans containing nondebtor 
releases and injunctions.111  These courts reason that section 105 equitable 
 
 106. Id. at 221.  American Home Products contributed $2.155 billion to the trust. Id. at 
311.  American Home Products was willing to do this because, as one drug analyst said at 
the time, other profitable Robins products such as Robitussin and Chapstick made the acqui-
sition the “steal of the century.” Id. at 334-35 (quoting Malcolm Gladwell, American 
Home’s “Steal” of a Deal for A.H. Robins, WASH. POST, Dec. 15, 1989, at F1). 
 107. Id. at 221-22.  Although the Robins family were named as defendants in the class 
action and were granted nondebtor releases, the judicial approvals of the settlement do not 
address their potential liability. See Brubaker, Nondebtor Releases, supra note 89, at 5 n.16 
(citing Dalkon Shield Claimants’ Comm. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. (In re A. H. Robins Co.), 
88 B.R. 755, 758-63 (E.D. Va. 1988), aff’d, 880 F.2d 709, 748-52 (4th Cir. 1989); Menard-
Sanford v. Mabey (In re A. H. Robins Co.), 880 F.2d 694, 700-01 & n.6 (4th Cir. 1989)). 
 108. SOBOL, supra note 90, at 221. 
 109. See Silverstein, supra note 84, at 64. 
 110. A. H. Robins, 880 F.2d at 722 & n.15.  The family received American Home Prod-
ucts stock worth $385 million as a tax-free distribution on their A. H. Robins stock under 
the reorganization plan. See Brubaker, Bankruptcy Injunctions, supra note 77, at 993 n.124. 
 111. See, e.g., Resorts Int’l, Inc. v. Lowenschuss (In re Lowenschuss), 67 F.3d 1394, 
1401 (9th Cir. 1995) (“This court has repeatedly held, without exception, that § 524(e) prec-
ludes bankruptcy courts from discharging the liabilities of nondebtors.”); Landsing Diversi-
fied Props. v. First Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. (In re W. Real Estate Fund, Inc.), 922 F.2d 592, 
600 (10th Cir. 1990) (refusing to grant a permanent injunction that would relieve the third 
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powers are limited by section 524(e) of the Bankruptcy Code, which pro-
vides that discharge of a debtor in bankruptcy does not affect the liability of 
any other party.112 
a. In re American Hardwoods, Inc. 
In the Chapter 11 case of American Hardwoods (“American”), the Ninth 
Circuit denied a motion for a permanent injunction that would have barred 
Deutsche Credit Corporation (“Deutsche”) from enforcing a state court 
judgment against the Keelers, who as officers and shareholders of the deb-
tor had personally guaranteed its debt to Deutsche.113  At no point did the 
Keelers offer to contribute assets to American’s reorganization.114  Ameri-
can brought an adversary proceeding in the bankruptcy court, seeking both 
a temporary and permanent injunction staying Deutsche’s efforts to enforce 
the judgment against the Keelers.115  The bankruptcy court did temporarily 
enjoin Deutsche from enforcing the state court judgment against the Kee-
lers.116  However, the bankruptcy court found that while American’s reor-
ganization plan would likely fail if the state court judgment against the 
Keelers was enforced, the court did not have the power or jurisdiction to 
grant a permanent injunction against Deutsche.117  The district court af-
firmed the bankruptcy court’s holding,118 rejecting American’s argument 
that the bankruptcy court had power to permanently enjoin Deutsche pur-
suant to its section 105 powers.119  The Ninth Circuit, in affirming the hold-
ings of both the bankruptcy court and district court, distinguished this case 
from In re A. H. Robins Co., stating that there were no such unusual cir-
 
party of liability to the creditor, reasoning “it is the debtor, who has invoked and submitted 
to the bankruptcy process, that is entitled to its protections; Congress did not intend to ex-
tend such benefits to third-party bystanders”); Am. Hardwoods, Inc. v. Deutsche Credit 
Corp. (In re Am. Hardwoods, Inc.), 885 F.2d 621 (9th Cir. 1989); Underhill v. Royal, 769 
F.2d 1426 (9th Cir. 1985) (finding release of debtor’s founder and other related parties from 
all claims arising from notes executed by the debtor was unenforceable and eventually en-
tering judgment against the debtor’s founder for securities law violations relating to the 
note); Whispering Pines Estates, Inc. v. Flash Island, Inc. (In re Whispering Pines Estates, 
Inc.), 370 B.R. 452 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2007) (reversing bankruptcy court order confirming 
plan which included a release of the creditor who proposed the plan). 
 112. 11 U.S.C. § 524(e) (2006) (“Except as provided in subsection (a)(3) of this section, 
discharge of a debt of the debtor does not affect the liability of any other entity on, or the 
property of any other entity for, such debt.”). 
 113. Am. Hardwoods, Inc., 885 F.2d at 622. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 622-23. 
 118. Id. at 623. 
 119. Id. at 624. 
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cumstances here warranting the enjoining of claims against nondebtor third 
parties.120  Unlike A. H. Robins, the Ninth Circuit noted that American did 
not face mass tort claims estimated at almost $2.5 billion, the permanent 
injunction was not overwhelmingly approved by American’s creditors as it 
was by A. H. Robins’ creditors, and the injunction would affect American’s 
largest creditor, not simply a small fraction of creditors as it had in the A. 
H. Robins case.121  Lastly, the Ninth Circuit noted that American did not 
propose, and the district court did not find, that the permanent injunction 
was “essential” to a successful plan of reorganization, a factor on which the 
A. H. Robins court relied heavily.122 
b. In re Continental Airlines 
The Third Circuit rejected the use of nondebtor third party releases in the 
reorganization of Continental Airlines (“Continental”).123  Directors and 
officers of Continental faced several securities fraud class actions.124  Con-
tinental filed for Chapter 11 and the bankruptcy court temporarily enjoined 
the class actions.125  Continental, its D&O liability insurers, and its direc-
tors and officers entered into a tripartite settlement by which each party re-
leased all others from liability.126  The D&O liability insurers also provided 
$5 million to Continental to settle all claims and potential claims against 
the directors and officers.127  Continental then filed a plan of reorganization 
that contained provisions releasing and permanently enjoining claims 
against the directors and officers, including those of the securities fraud 
class action plaintiffs.128  The bankruptcy court approved the plan, and the 
district court affirmed, explaining that the release and permanent injunction 
of the lawsuits was a “key element” of the reorganization because Conti-
nental would have to indemnify its directors and officers, thereby diminish-
ing assets of the estate.129  In addition, the district court reasoned that the 
lawsuits would distract the reorganized debtor, but the court did not support 
its conclusions with any factual evidence in the record.130  On appeal, the 
 
 120. Id. at 627. 
 121. Id. (citing Menard-Sanford v. Mabey (In re A. H. Robins Co.), 880 F.2d 694 (4th 
Cir. 1989)). 
 122. Id. (citing A. H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d at 694). 
 123. Gillman v. Cont’l Airlines (In re Cont’l Airlines), 203 F.3d 203 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 124. Id. at 205. 
 125. Id. at 206. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 207-08. 
 130. See id. at 208. 
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Third Circuit held that the release and permanent injunction of the lawsuits 
were both “legally and factually insupportable.”131  It questioned the dis-
trict court’s finding that the release and permanent injunction of claims 
against the directors and officers were actually a key element of the reor-
ganization, noting that federal courts often refuse to recognize indemnity 
obligations for federal securities law violations.132  Even if the debtor were 
to face indemnity obligations, however, the court found that these potential 
future obligations did not make the release and permanent injunction “ne-
cessary” to the successful reorganization of the debtor.133  The court con-
cluded that “granting permanent injunctions to protect non-debtor parties 
on the basis of theoretical identity of interest alone would turn bankruptcy 
principles on their head.  Nothing in the Bankruptcy Code can be construed 
to establish such extraordinary protection for non-debtor parties.”134 
B. Arguments for and Against Granting Nondebtor Releases and 
Injunctions to Insiders and Insurers in Chapter 11 Plans 
Nondebtor releases and injunctions are often requested by insiders of the 
debtor or, particularly in mass tort cases, the debtor’s insurers.  Many scho-
lars have weighed in on both sides of this issue, as is discussed in this sec-
tion. 
1. Should Insiders Be Granted Nondebtor Releases or Injunctions? 
Insiders of the debtor include directors, officers, and other high-ranking 
employees of the debtor.  Officers and directors may agree not to assert a 
claim against the debtor in exchange for a release from personal liability.  
There are various ways in which insiders may be found personally liable.  
Creditors or shareholders may assert a breach of fiduciary duty claim or at-
tempt to pierce the corporate veil.  With regards to tort liability, an insider 
may have liability distinct from that of the debtor, because employees are 
still directly liable for their own torts. 
Those who benefit from this type of release are most likely the ones as-
serting that the debtor will be irreparably harmed without it, so courts have 
held that, in order to prevent self-dealing, they will subject these claims to 
rigorous scrutiny.135 
 
 131. Id. at 211-12. 
 132. See id. at 215-16. 
 133. See id. at 216 n.15. 
 134. See id. at 217. 
 135. See, e.g., Spach v. Bryant, 309 F.2d 886 (5th Cir. 1962); Hopper v. Am. Nat’l Bank 
(In re Smith-Chadderdon Buick, Inc.), 309 F.2d 244 (10th Cir. 1962). 
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a. Arguments for Allowing Releases and Injunctions to Insiders 
First, some argue that there is a need to obtain the release of insiders’ in-
demnity and contribution claims against the debtor.  Debtors have argued 
that suits against insiders will inevitably result in indemnity and contribu-
tion claims against the debtor and embroil the debtor in litigation.136  
Granting these injunctions would prevent creditors from pressuring the 
debtor through its insiders.  It would prevent creditors from “doing indi-
rectly what the Code prevents them from doing directly.”137 
A second argument set forth by both courts and scholars is that releases 
and injunctions are necessary to secure insider assistance and cooperation.  
In other words, the debtor would suffer irreparable harm if the insiders 
were tied up in litigation rather than directing their attention towards reor-
ganization of the debtor.138  The idea is that insiders have the most know-
ledge about the inner workings of the debtor and are in the best position to 
lead the reorganization.  Courts have even granted releases to employees 
who have left the company, reasoning that their cooperation is needed for 
the reorganized entity’s pursuit of legal claims against others.139 
The third main argument asserted for granting releases or injunctions to 
insiders, and the most common situation in which they are granted,140 is the 
“contributing nondebtor theory.”  Releases or injunctions are granted in ex-
change for payments to the debtor in order to fund the reorganization.141 
b. Arguments Against Allowing Releases or Injunctions to Insiders 
Many courts and scholars have argued that there is no pressing need to 
obtain the release of insiders’ indemnity and contribution claims against the 
debtor.142  For matured indemnity claims—claims on which an insider is 
 
 136. See Menard-Sanford v. Mabey (In re A. H. Robins Co.), 880 F.2d 694, 702 (4th Cir. 
1989) (noting that entire reorganization hinges “on [the] debtor being free from indirect 
claims such as suits against parties who would have indemnity or contribution claims 
against the debtor”). 
 137. Judith R. Starr, Bankruptcy Court Jurisdiction to Release Insiders from Creditor 
Claims in Corporate Reorganizations, 9 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 485, 493 (1993). 
 138. Id. at 497 (citing SEC v. Drexel Burnham Lambert Grp., Inc. (In re Drexel Burnham 
Lambert Grp., Inc.), 130 B.R. 910, 928 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), aff’d, 960 F.2d 285 (2d Cir. 1992); 
Otero Mills, Inc. v. Sec. Bank & Trust (In re Otero Mills, Inc.), 21 B.R. 777, 778-79 (Bankr. 
D.N.M. 1982), aff’d, 25 B.R. 1018 (D.N.M.)). 
 139. Id. (citing Drexel Burnham Lambert Grp., Inc., 130 B.R. at 928). 
 140. Id. at 498. 
 141. But see A. H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d at 702 (finding insiders’ $10 million contribution 
to the plan not to be substnatial enough for release, contrary to bankruptcy court’s holding). 
 142. See, e.g., THOMAS J. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 23-25 
(1986) (arguing that the policy behind bankruptcy law is to approve a reorganization plan 
only where the value of the debtor to creditors and shareholders, taking into account all of 
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jointly liable with the debtor—the insider’s claim against the estate is sub-
ject to various qualifications.143  Section 502(e)(1)(A) of the Code provides 
that if a claim is not allowable against the debtor, any claim for contribu-
tion or reimbursement from the disallowed claim must also be disal-
lowed.144  In addition, section 509(c) provides that if the underlying claim 
is an allowed claim against the estate,145 the insider’s claim will be subor-
dinated to that allowed claim until the claimant has been paid in full.146  
Lastly, courts have consistently disallowed claims for indemnity or contri-
bution that are inconsistent with substantive non-bankruptcy law.147  In ad-
dition, the Code renders contingent indemnity claims—“indemnity claims 
based only on the potential liability of the insider to a third party”—
worthless if they do not mature prior to confirmation and discharge.148 
Courts that base injunctions on the need for insider assistance and coop-
eration often make no findings of the extent of harm the debtor will suffer, 
the likelihood of the insider refusing to cooperate, or the lack of legal me-
thods to obtain the insider’s cooperation.149  When courts require insiders 
to do so, they often are unable to demonstrate the probability of irreparable 
harm to the debtor without their cooperation or assistance.150  In addition, 
companies outside of the bankruptcy context are able to function when 
faced with litigation, so some argue there is no reason to think that compa-
nies in bankruptcy are any less capable of dealing with the effects of litiga-
 
the risks, exceeds the value in liquidation); Starr, supra note 137, at 494 n.54 (“To the extent 
that claims against insiders are so significant and intertwined with claims against the debtor 
that they threaten the debtor’s ability to reorganize, reorganization may not be a feasible al-
ternative to liquidation.  In this scenario, the bankruptcy court would not be acting to protect 
its jurisdiction by enjoining litigation against insiders but would be stacking the deck in fa-
vor of a reorganization, when the real world equities favored a liquidation.”). 
 143. See Starr, supra note 137, at 494. 
 144. 11 U.S.C. § 502(e)(1)(A) (2006); see also Baldwin-United Corp., 55 B.R. 885, 893-
94 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1985). 
 145. See 11 U.S.C. § 502 (explains the allowance of claims). 
 146. 11 U.S.C. § 509(c); see also Baldwin-United Corp., 55 B.R. at 895. 
 147. See, e.g., Gillman v. Cont’l Airlines (In re Cont’l Airlines), 203 F.3d 203, 215-16 
(3d Cir. 2000) (finding indemnification by the debtor not available for securities law viola-
tions on the part of officers and directors of the debtor); Baldwin-United Corp., 55 B.R. at 
902-03 (disallowing indemnity claims arising from securities fraud suits because indemnity 
is not permissible under securities law). 
 148. See Starr, supra note 137, at 495. 
 149. Id. at 497. 
 150. See, e.g., JRT, Inc. v. TCBY Sys., Inc. (In re JRT, Inc.), 121 B.R. 314, 320 (Bankr. 
W.D. Mich. 1990); Univ. Med. Ctr. v. Am. Sterilizer Co. (In re Univ. Med. Ctr.), 82 B.R. 
754, 758 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988); Aboussie Bros. Const. Co. v. United Mo. Bank (In re Ab-
oussie Bros. Constr. Co.), 8 B.R. 302, 304 (E.D. Mo. 1981). 
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tion.151  Lastly, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure serve two important 
functions in this context by protecting certain employees from “unduly 
burdensome litigation demands” and enabling the reorganized entity to ob-
tain information from unwilling former insiders.152 
Professor Barry L. Zaretsky argued that if the debtor is the officer’s best 
employment opportunity, then he will remain with the debtor.153  If it is 
not, the officer will leave the debtor regardless of whether he receives a 
discharge.154  Professor Zaretsky explained that “unless the officer irration-
ally intends to disregard his own self-interest in favor of destroying the 
debtor, courts should treat threats to ‘throw in the towel’ as nothing more 
than empty threats.”155  Others have gone even further in urging that these 
individuals should not be able to gain releases or injunctions because they 
likely played an important role in driving the debtor into bankruptcy.156 
Critics of insider releases and injunctions have adamantly opposed the 
theory under which these releases and injunctions are most often granted—
the contributing nondebtor theory.  Under the Bankruptcy Code, the debtor 
must disclose all of its assets and submit these assets to the court’s control.  
In exchange, the court can force creditors to take a pro rata distribution and 
prevent them from taking further action through the discharge provi-
sions.157  Courts outside of bankruptcy have no power to force claimants to 
accept monetary settlements that the claimants believe are inadequate.158  
 
 151. “Non-bankrupt companies cope with the disruptive effects of litigation on a regular 
basis and there is no reason to assume that reorganized companies are any less able to do 
so.” Starr, supra note 137, at 497 (citing In re Keyco, Inc., 49 B.R. 507, 510 (Bankr. 
E.D.N.Y. 1985)). 
 152. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26-37 (governing discovery in civil proceedings in federal 
courts). 
 153. See Zaretsky, Co-Debtor Stays, supra note 35, at 272. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id.  “Bankruptcy court is simply not an appropriate forum for stopping the clock on 
a principal’s life in an effort to retain his undivided energy and attention.” Id. at 230. 
 156. See, e.g., Peter M. Boyle, Note, Non-Debtor Liability in Chapter 11: Validity of 
Third-Party Discharge in Bankruptcy, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 421, 447 (1992) (“Bribing a 
corporate officer with a discharge in order to secure that officer’s assistance in a reorganiza-
tion, when that officer presumably played a role in the debtor’s financial demise, is not an 
equitable solution particularly when such discharge will impair the rights or claims of credi-
tors.  The officer’s assistance may be desirable and in certain circumstances necessary, but 
the threat, either expressed or implied, of ‘throwing in the towel’ is tantamount to extortion, 
and an extortionist does not deserve equitable relief even if that relief may benefit the deb-
tor.”). 
 157. See Starr, supra note 137, at 498 (“It is the acceptance of this burden by the debtor, 
together with the economic reality that a debtor in bankruptcy cannot pay all claims against 
it in full, which form the basis for the extraordinary power of the court to force a creditor to 
accept less than full value for its claim.”). 
 158. Id. 
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Judith Starr, formerly Senior Counsel to the Securities and Exchange 
Commission,159 questions why courts allow a solvent insider to take the 
benefits of bankruptcy because of his relationship with the debtor, by forc-
ing a claimant to accept a less than adequate settlement, when he does not 
have to accept the burdens of the Code such as disclosing all of his assets 
and submitting them to the control of the bankruptcy court.160 
Opponents of insider releases and injunctions also argue that they un-
dermine the policy behind joint and several liability, and may present a 
moral hazard to insiders looking to shield themselves from personal liabili-
ty.161  The rationale behind joint and several liability is to ensure that vic-
tims are fully compensated in the event one or more of the tortfeasors is 
unable to pay.162  An officer or director is liable for her tortious conduct 
even though the conduct may have been in furtherance of the company’s 
interests and within the scope of employment.163  This may incentivize in-
siders to bring the debtor into bankruptcy in order to avoid personal liabili-
ty.164 
2. Should Debtors’ Insurers Be Granted Nondebtor Releases or 
Injunctions? 
The debtor’s insurance is often one of the primary assets for certain 
types of claimants, such as personal injury claimants, who may be able to 
recover a greater amount of their claim from the insurance company than 
the debtor.165  An insurer may be considered a co-debtor since the insurer 
 
 159. Id. at 485. 
 160. Id. at 498. 
 161. See, e.g., id. (“A moral hazard is present because insiders may be tempted to engage 
in high risk behavior by the knowledge that they can protect themselves from its conse-
quences by taking the corporation into chapter 11.  This protection from liability may tempt 
insiders to take the corporation into chapter 11 in circumstances where they otherwise 
would not do so.”). 
 162. See Boyle, supra note 156, at 444. 
 163. See e.g., Inforex, Inc. v. Burridge (In re Inforex, Inc.), 26 B.R. 515, 518 (Bankr. D. 
Mass. 1983). 
 164. A. H. Robins and Johns-Manville both involved allegations that corporate manage-
ment brought the company into Chapter 11 in an effort to limit their own liability. See Me-
nard-Sanford v. Mabey (In re A. H. Robins Co.), 880 F.2d 694, 702 (4th Cir. 1989); MacAr-
thur Co. v. Johns-Manville Corp (In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 36 B.R. 727, 730 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y.), aff’d, 837 F.2d 89 (2d Cir. 1988); see also SOBOL, supra note 90, at 327 (noting 
that both companies were solvent at the time of filing, but the courts held that if a company 
foresees insolvency, the company does not have to wait until it is actually insolvent to file.  
In the case of A. H. Robins, the bankruptcy petition was alleged to be a tactic to consolidate 
all of the Dalkon Shield litigation before a judge thought to be more sympathetic to the deb-
tor). 
 165. See Zaretsky, Insurance Proceeds, supra note 18, at 373. 
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has contracted to fund the debtor’s obligations with its own funds to the ex-
tent those obligations are covered under the insurance policy.166  As noted 
previously, co-debtors are not covered by the automatic stay, so claimants 
may attempt to recover by pursuing the debtor’s insurer directly.167  The 
claimants’ success depends in part on whether the court treats the insurance 
proceeds as property of the estate.168 
Most courts treat liability insurance proceeds as property of the estate.169  
The bankruptcy court, therefore, has the power to control the equitable dis-
tribution of the proceeds to all creditors,170 and the automatic stay prevents 
creditors from recovering this property outside the bankruptcy proceed-
ing.171  If proceeds of an insurance policy are not considered property of 
the estate, the insurance company may be directly liable to the victims.172  
Issues arise when the insurer’s liability, which is limited by the terms of the 
policy, does not cover the amount of all of the claims.173  Since the insur-
ance proceeds will be distributed according to non-bankruptcy law, a race 
to the proceeds may ensue.174 
Unique problems arise in relation to equitable distribution of insurance 
proceeds when there are claims that “have not yet matured or when some 
claims have not been reduced to judgment.”175  Future claimants rights to 
insurance proceeds and the protections afforded to future claimants in 
bankruptcy proceedings will be addressed in more detail in Part III.176 
 
 166. See id. at 383. 
 167. See supra text accompanying notes 35-36. 
 168. See Zaretsky, Insurance Proceeds, supra note 18, at 384 (“[T]he extent to which the 
bankruptcy court has the power to oversee the allocation of insurance proceeds among clai-
mants, and to prevent a race to recover those proceeds, depends in large part on whether the 
insurance proceeds become property of the estate.”). 
 169. See id. at 395; Silverstein, supra note 84, at 27-28; see also H.R. REP. NO. 595, at 
367-68 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963 (noting Congress intentionally con-
strued the language “property of the estate” broadly). 
 170. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (2006). 
 171. 11 U.S.C. § 362. 
 172. See Owaski v. Jet Fla. Sys., Inc. (In re Jet Fla. Sys., Inc.), 883 F.2d 970, 973 (11th 
Cir. 1989) (holding claimants are not precluded from proceeding against debtor by section 
524(e) where claimant is ultimately trying to collect from the debtor’s insurer).  Even if in-
surance proceeds are not treated as property of the estate, the court may still exercise control 
over the proceeds through its equitable powers.  This would require affirmative action on 
behalf of the trustee to obtain an injunction to prevent distributional problems. See Zaretsky, 
Insurance Proceeds, supra note 18, at 401 (“In effect, then, a bankruptcy court could pro-
vide sufficient protection to a debtor and its insurers even if the insurance proceeds were not 
considered property of the estate.”). 
 173. See Zaretsky, Co-Debtor Stays, supra note 35, at 276. 
 174. See Boyle, supra note 156, at 449. 
 175. Zaretsky, Insurance Proceeds, supra note 18, at 405. 
 176. See infra Part III.A. 
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a. Arguments for Granting Releases and Injunctions to Insurers 
Some courts are willing to grant releases to debtors’ insurers that agree 
to contribute to the plan of the reorganization.177  This is based on the con-
tributing nondebtor theory discussed earlier in relation to insiders.178  For 
Chapter 11 debtors facing mass tort claims or securities class actions, vari-
ous courts have released insurance companies in exchange for contributing 
funds to a trust upon which the plaintiffs could draw.179 
b. Arguments Against Granting Releases and Injunctions to Insurers 
When there is no dispute as to the distribution of insurance proceeds, 
scholars argue that the non-bankruptcy policy goal of satisfying tort clai-
mants in a timely manner favors less interference from the courts.180  Under 
those circumstances, incentivizing an insurance company to contribute to a 
plan of reorganization in exchange for a release is misguided because the 
results will be the same whether the claimants recover inside or outside of 
bankruptcy, and the debtor does not gain a benefit either. 
Another argument asserted by courts and scholars opposed to releasing 
insurance companies in exchange for contributing to the plan is that insur-
ance companies are simply fulfilling contractual obligations by paying out 
the amount due under the terms of the insurance policy.181 
 
 177. See, e.g., MacArthur Co. v. Johns-Manville Corp. (In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 837 
F.2d 89, 90 (2d Cir. 1988) (finding that insurer’s funding of claimants fund in exchange for 
discharge of liabilities was a “cornerstone” of the reorganization); UNARCO Bloomington 
Factory Workers v. UNR Indus., 124 B.R. 268, 278 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (upholding discharge of 
insurance company that funded the reorganization, but indicating that discharge would not 
be appropriate for insurers that did not settle and contribute proceeds to the reorganization). 
 178. See supra text accompanying notes 140-141. 
 179. See, e.g., Johns-Manville Corp., 837 F.2d at 90-91 (third party insurer channeled 
$770 million settlement fund); SOBOL, supra note 90, at 219 (A. H. Robins’ reorganization 
plan provided for a contribution of unused insurance proceeds from the third party insurer). 
 180. See Zaretsky, Insurance Proceeds, supra note 18, at 414-15. 
However, when multiple claimants seek insurance proceeds that appears [sic] to 
be insufficient to satisfy the claims, the problem of equitable distribution of the 
debtor’s assets among claimants arises and may outweigh the nonbankruptcy in-
terest in timely satisfaction of claims.  In that event, the bankruptcy court may as-
sert jurisdiction over the policy proceeds, both during and, if necessary, after the 
close of a bankruptcy case, in order to enforce an equitable distribution of the 
proceeds among the claimants. 
Id. at 415. 
 181. See, e.g., In re Mahoney Hawkes, LLP, 289 B.R. 285, 300-01 (Bankr. D. Mass. 
2002) (ruling that an insurance company’s payment to the estate under the debtor’s policy 
did not constitute a “substantial contribution” for purposes of satisfying the Master Mort-
gage test because the insurance company was just fulfilling its contractual obligation). 
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III.  THE LIMITED POWER OF BANKRUPTCY COURTS TO GRANT 
NONDEBTOR RELEASES AND INJUNCTIONS 
It is my view that bankruptcy courts do have the authority to grant non-
debtor third party releases and injunctions.  As discussed previously, sec-
tion 105(a) grants the bankruptcy courts broad equitable powers in carrying 
out the provisions of the Code.182  Further statutory authority is found in 
section 1123(b)(6), which provides that a plan may contain “any other ap-
propriate provision not inconsistent with the applicable provisions of this 
title.”183  And, Bankruptcy Rule 3016(c) indicates that Congress may have 
considered nondebtor injunctions because the rule states that if a plan pro-
vides for an injunction not specifically authorized in the Code, such provi-
sion and the affected parties must be identified in the plan and disclosure 
statement.184  While section 524(e) has been cited by anti-release courts 
and academics as a statutory limit on the authority of bankruptcy courts to 
grant nondebtor third party releases,185 this section does not expressly limit 
bankruptcy courts’ authority to approve nondebtor third party releases.  
Section 524(e) states that “discharge of a debt of the debtor does not affect 
the liability of any other entity on, or the property of any other entity for, 
such debt.”186  As the Seventh Circuit reasoned in a recent case, if Con-
gress intended to limit this authority, it could have “used mandatory terms 
such as ‘shall’ or ‘will’ rather than the definitional term ‘does.’”187  Al-
though section 524(e) clearly should not be read as an automatic release of 
co-obligors, it does not prohibit a bankruptcy court from taking separate ac-
tion under its equitable powers to grant these releases. 
A 2009 United States Supreme Court decision, in dicta, approved of 
bankruptcy courts’ authority to confirm a plan with a third party release.188  
In Travelers, the Supreme Court revisited the approval of the settlement be-
tween Johns-Manville and its insurers, which released the insurers from all 
tort liability in exchange for a contribution by the insurance companies of 
$770 million to the plan.189  When asbestos tort claimants attempted to 
bring action against the insurers sixteen years later, the bankruptcy court 
 
 182. See 11 U.S.C. § 105 (2006); supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
 183. See 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(6); supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
 184. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 3016(c); supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
 185. See supra Part II.A.2. 
 186. 11 U.S.C. § 524(e). 
 187. Airadigm Commc’ns, Inc. v. FCC (In re Airadigm Commc’ns, Inc.), 519 F.3d 640, 
656 (7th Cir. 2008). 
 188. See Travelers Indem. Co. v. Bailey, 129 S. Ct. 2195 (2009). 
 189. Id. at 2199. 
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enjoined the action.190  The Supreme Court rejected the argument that the 
bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction, noting that “the Bankruptcy Court 
plainly had jurisdiction to interpret and enforce its own jurisdiction to in-
terpret and enforce its own prior orders.”191  Accordingly, the Supreme 
Court implied that the bankruptcy court initially had authority to approve 
the third party release and injunction.192 
Having come to the conclusion that bankruptcy courts do have the au-
thority to grant nondebtor releases and injunctions, I will now argue that 
this power should be used only in very rare circumstances. 
A. Policy Considerations Dictate that Injunctions and Releases Be 
Granted to Insurance Companies in Mass Tort and Class Action 
Cases, Subject to Several Caveats 
Under certain circumstances, insurers should be granted releases or in-
junctions against future suits because doing so will aid the debtor’s reor-
ganization and will promote the fair and equitable distribution of assets to 
creditors.193  There is a unique need for nondebtor releases and injunctions 
in class actions and mass tort cases.  When insurance proceeds do not cover 
all potential claims, issues arise.  If the insurance proceeds are not consi-
dered “property of the estate,” there will be a race to the proceeds and the 
insurance company will simply pay out the proceeds on a first-come, first-
served basis.  This leaves some claimants paid in full and others without 
any form of compensation or redress.194  Thus, it is best to bring the policy 
proceeds into the bankruptcy proceeding, and an efficient way in which to 
do this is by channeling the proceeds into a claimants trust.  Even when in-
surance proceeds are considered “property of the estate,” it is best to chan-
nel the funds into a trust so that the insurance proceeds are available to the 
victim claimants and not to the general body of creditors.195 
 
 190. Id. at 2201. 
 191. Id. at 2205. 
 192. See Joan N. Feeney, BANKRUPTCY LAW MANUAL § 11A:58 (5th ed. 2010). 
 193. Tort claimants are not considered creditors by all courts, however they will be in-
cluded in the definition of creditors for the argument in this Note. 
 194. See, e.g., Hartford Cas. Ins. Co. v. Dodd, 416 F. Supp. 1216, 1219 (D. Md. 1976), 
aff’d, 568 F.2d 773 (4th Cir. 1978) (insurer is not required to wait until all claimants come 
forward before distributing proceeds). 
 195. See, e.g., Boyle, supra, note 156, at 448-49 (noting that an interesting effect of in-
cluding insurance proceeds within the Code’s definition of “property of the estate” is that 
the proceeds become available to “non-victim creditors”).  These creditors are essentially 
granted a windfall as they would otherwise not have access to the insurance proceeds. 
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Mass tort cases196 present a unique problem for bankruptcy courts in part 
because of the need to protect the interests of future claimants.  Asbestos 
claimants and other personal injury claimants may be unaware of their inju-
ries for years, and there is a danger that the Chapter 11 debtor will receive a 
discharge from liability well before some claimants’ injuries are even 
known.197  By creating a claimants trust, future claimants’ interests can best 
be protected.  The trust, funded in part by insurance proceeds, but often al-
so with a percentage of the reorganized entity’s profits, as well as equity in 
the reorganized entity, can continue to pay out claims as claimants become 
aware of their injuries. 
Circuit courts that have dealt with Chapter 11 debtors facing mass tort 
and class action litigation have found occasion to grant the debtor’s insur-
ers releases in exchange for channeling insurance proceeds into a claimants 
fund.198  Going forward, bankruptcy courts confronted with mass tort litiga-
tion and class actions that pose insurmountable challenges to a reorganiza-
tion plan should consider granting releases to insurers who will agree to 
contribute to a claimants fund, subject to several caveats.  These caveats 
are discussed next. 
First, the insurer must contribute some additional value to the plan of re-
organization beyond what it is contractually obligated to provide.  This 
may be in the form of a monetary contribution above and beyond what the 
insurer is contractually obligated to pay under the policy, a promise by the 
insurer not to litigate whether the claims are actually covered under the pol-
icy, or preferably, both.  Debtor’s insurers will often dispute whether 
claims are covered.199  The court must determine whether there is in fact a 
good faith dispute or whether the insurer is raising a non-meritorious de-
fense.  If the insurer’s defense is meritless, the court should deny the re-
lease or injunction to the insurer because the insurer is simply tying the 
debtor up in costly litigation.  If the insurer’s assertion is made in good 
faith, the court should consider granting a release or injunction to the insur-
er in exchange for its contribution to the plan.  Assets of the estate will not 
 
 196. Securities litigation class actions do not raise the same issues because the claimants 
are generally known. 
 197. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 93. 
 198. See, e.g., Menard-Sanford v. Mabey (In re A. H. Robins Co.), 880 F.2d 694, 696 
(4th Cir. 1989) (third party insurer contributed assets to a claimants fund); MacArthur Co. v. 
Johns-Manville Corp. (In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 837 F.2d 89, 90 (2d Cir. 1988) (third 
party insurer contributed $770 million to a claimants fund). 
 199. See, e.g., Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Fibreboard Corp., 762 F. Supp. 1368, 1369 (N.D. Cal. 
1991), aff’d, 953 F.2d 1386 (9th Cir. 1992), vacated, 113 S. Ct. 399 (1992) (insurer brought 
an action seeking declaratory judgment that it was not obligated to indemnify asbestos man-
ufacturer for punitive damages awarded to personal injury claimants by juries in two states). 
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be wasted litigating with the insurer over whether the claims actually fall 
within the insurance policy.  The time that is saved by eliminating litigation 
between the debtor and its insurers will benefit both the debtor, which will 
be able to focus on the reorganization, and tort claimants, who will be able 
to recover more quickly for their injuries.  In A. H. Robins, Aetna initially 
disputed whether the claims were covered under the policy, but ultimately 
agreed not only to contribute all of the remaining product liability insur-
ance proceeds to the trust for the benefit of the Dalkon Shield victims, but 
also to cover an additional $100 million in outlier insurance and $250 mil-
lion in excess insurance in exchange for a release from future liability.200  If 
this additional value is not secured from the insurer, the insurer would gain 
a release without providing adequate consideration.  The additional contri-
bution will be beneficial to the debtor because it will increase the value of 
the debtor’s estate; this, in turn, will benefit creditors through a larger re-
turn on their claims. 
Second, bankruptcy courts should consider granting claimants an option 
to opt out of the settlement and to pursue their claims against the insurer 
separately.  To use the case of A. H. Robins again as an example, the Dal-
kon Shield victims were given an option to opt out of the settlement so that 
they could pursue claims against their medical providers and Aetna.201  An 
opt-out provision is important because it protects claimants’ due process 
rights.  At the same time, however, courts need to consider whether an in-
surer will be willing to contribute to the plan of reorganization if the insurer 
is not assured of a cap on its liability.  Claimants who opt out may attempt 
to recover punitive damages from the insurer, which could deter insurers 
from agreeing to an opt-out provision.  The A. H. Robins court handled this 
issue by allowing Dalkon Shield victims that opted out of the settlement to 
recover only compensatory damages (not punitive) from Aetna.202 
Although bankruptcy courts have the power to grant releases to insur-
ance companies in these situations, it is a power that should be exercised 
with great care.  Not every Chapter 11 reorganization is successful and 
bankruptcy courts must find only by a preponderance of the evidence that a 
 
 200. A. H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d at 701 n.6; cf. In re Mahoney Hawkes, LLP, 289 B.R. 
285, 300 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2002) (holding that an insurance company’s payment to the es-
tate under the debtor’s policy did not constitute substantial contribution for purposes of sa-
tisfying the Master Mortgage test because the insurance company was just fulfilling its con-
tractual obligation). 
 201. A. H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d at 701 & n.7 (noting that of 110,000 class B claims, only 
2960 exercised their right to opt out). 
 202. See supra note 102 and accompanying text. 
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plan is “feasible.”203  Risk is high in mass tort cases where the value of tort 
claims is unknown; for example, in Johns-Manville, far more individuals 
filed personal injury claims than anticipated and the litigation trust that was 
set up was eventually able to pay only five percent of a claim’s value.204  
Bankruptcy courts, therefore, should be exceedingly cautious in using sec-
tion 105 powers to approve Chapter 11 plans containing channeling injunc-
tions and releases of debtors’ insurers. 
B. Policy Considerations and a Changing Landscape Dictate that 
Releases and Injunctions Not Be Granted to Debtors’ Insiders 
Although asbestos mass tort litigation may for the most part be behind 
us, the bankruptcy courts have certainly not been granted any reprieve.  In 
the face of a crippling recession, 89,402 companies filed for bankruptcy in 
2009, thirty-eight percent more than in 2008.205  The year 2009 ushered in 
a fifty percent increase in the number of public companies filing for bank-
ruptcy from 2008, the highest number since 2002.206  The number of large 
companies, with $1 billion in assets or more, that filed was also fifty per-
cent higher than in 2008.207  The year 2009 witnessed the filings of some of 
the largest Chapter 11 cases ever: General Motors Corporation, Chrysler 
LLC, CIT Group, Inc., and General Growth Properties, Inc., to name just a 
few.208  These mammoth filings followed the largest corporate bankruptcy 
in American history, the failure of the Wall Street investment bank Lehman 
Brothers.209 
1. Shift Towards Pre-Arranged Bankruptcies and Use of Turnaround 
Management Renders the Insider Assistance and Cooperation Justification 
for Insider Releases and Injunctions Moot 
Not only has there been a boom in large public company Chapter 11 fil-
ings in recent years, there seems to be a fundamental shift, for many, in the 
 
 203. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(11) (2006) (laying out the feasibility requirement, that a 
Chapter 11 reorganization plan cannot be confirmed if it is likely to result in “liquidation, or 
the need for further financial reorganization of the debtor or its successors”). 
 204. See Silverstein, supra note 84, at 82-83 (citing Findley v. Trs. of Manville Pers. In-
jury Settlement Trust (In re Joint E. and S. Dist. Asbestos Litig.), 237 F. Supp. 2d 297, 303 
(E.D.N.Y. & S.D.N.Y. 2002)). 
 205. Michael J. de la Merced, 2009: A Banner Year for Bankruptcies, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 
10, 2010), http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/02/10/2009-a-banner-year-for-
bankruptcies. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. 
 209. See id. 
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Chapter 11 bankruptcy process.  Large public companies are increasingly 
taking advantage of alternatives to the traditional reorganization process.210  
Prepackaged business bankruptcies (“prepacks”) and “363 sales,” named 
for section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code, are both methods of prearranging 
reorganization, or at least a portion of the reorganization, prior to filing the 
Chapter 11 petition. 
“A prepack ‘is negotiated and accepted prior to the filing of a Chapter 11 
case but . . . is approved and confirmed by the court in a subsequently filed 
Chapter 11 case.’”211  In a prepack, creditors are solicited and the votes are 
obtained prior to the filing.  One of the main benefits of a prepack is the 
speed with which a debtor can enter and exit the bankruptcy process.212  
CIT Group, Inc. filed a prepack on November 1, 2009 and emerged from 
bankruptcy just forty days later with $10.5 billion less in debt.213  This con-
trasts sharply with the twelve to thirty-six months required for a normal 
Chapter 11 reorganization.214  Recent trends have also shown a rise in the 
number of quick sales of debtor assets, enabling the business to restart un-
der new ownership.215  Commonly referred to as “363 sales,” Chrysler LLC 
and others have taken advantage of this alternative to the traditionally leng-
thy reorganization process.216 
 
 210. Mike Spector, Quickie Bankruptcy Filings: Companies Zoom In, Zoom Out, WALL 
ST. J. (Jan. 5, 2010), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704789404574636164199387026.html 
(“In 2009, the number of prearranged bankruptcies, in which many creditors approve a reor-
ganization plan ahead of a filing, tripled to 30 among publicly traded companies compared 
with the year before . . . .”). 
 211. Rhett G. Campbell, Prepacks Reduce Time and Costs of Business Filings, NAT’L 
L.J. (Mar. 5, 2007), available at http://www.tklaw.com/resources/documents/Rhett%20 
Campbell_National%20Law%20Journal_Prepacks%20Reduce%20Time%20and%20Costs 
%20of%20Business%20Fiilings.pdf (quoting 4 WILLIAM L. NORTON, NORTON BANKRUPTCY 
LAW & PRACTICE 2D § 86:1 (2007)). 
 212. Id. (“Speed is a prepack’s primary benefit.”). 
 213. See Spector, supra note 210. 
 214. See Campbell, supra note 211 (“The average business bankruptcy in 2005 required 
19.5 months to reach confirmation . . . .”). 
 215. See William J. Burnett, Trustee Talk in Troubled Times: A Conversation About 
Commercial Chapter 7 Cases and the Role of Trustee’s Counsel During the Great Reces-
sion, ASPATORE 1 (Mar. 2010), available at 2010 WL 895206. 
 216. See, e.g., Fla. Dep’t of Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc., 554 U.S. 33, 37 n.2 
(2008) (debtor filed a Chapter 11 liquidation plan after selling substantially all of its assets 
as a going concern pursuant to section 363(b)(1)); In re Chrysler LLC, 405 B.R. 84, 96 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“A debtor may sell substantially all of its assets as a going concern 
and later submit a plan of liquidation providing for the distribution of the proceeds of the 
sale. This strategy is employed, for example, when there is a need to preserve the going 
concern value because revenues are not sufficient to support the continued operation of the 
business and there are no viable sources for financing.”). 
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Additional changes have occurred in recent years that further problemat-
ize the practice of granting releases to Chapter 11 debtor insiders.  After the 
Enron scandal, followed closely by the failures of Worldcom, Inc. and 
Adelphia Communications, actions of insiders became headline news.217  
Although the Bankruptcy Code allows for the appointment of a trustee to 
take the place of the debtor-in-possession, no one made this motion in the 
Enron Corporation case, and Ken Lay and other insiders were given time to 
appoint their own replacement management.218  Partly in response to the 
failure to appoint a trustee in the Enron case, the 2005 Amendments to the 
Bankruptcy Code attempted to encourage courts and the U.S. Trustee’s of-
fice to appoint trustees in more Chapter 11 cases.219  Under the new 
amendments, the U.S. Trustee is required to move for appointment of a 
trustee “if there are reasonable grounds to suspect that current [manage-
ment] . . . participated in actual fraud, dishonesty, or criminal conduct.”220  
In addition, the bankruptcy court may replace the debtor-in-possession (i.e., 
the management of the debtor) with a trustee if it “is in the best interests of 
creditors and the estate.”221  Going forward, existing management may 
more and more frequently be replaced by trustees. 
Recent cases also indicate a surge in the use of Turnaround Management 
(TM) Specialists.  TM temporarily takes over the business in order to re-
structure and reorganize the company.222  TM served as trustees and as 
consensual replacement for management in some of the largest recent reor-
ganizations.223 
Although the concern always existed that current management was re-
sponsible for driving the company into bankruptcy and thus should not be 
trusted with its reorganization, these recent changes give additional reasons 
not to view current management as necessary to the reorganization, and 
therefore, not entitled to releases or injunctions.  As previously noted, one 
reason asserted for granting releases to insiders was to secure the insider’s 
continued support under the assumption that the insider had the most know-
ledge about the company and was best able to lead the reorganization.224  
 
 217. ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND 
CREDITORS 436 (6th ed. 2008). 
 218. See LYNN M. LOPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE: HOW COMPETITION FOR BIG CASES IS 
CORRUPTING THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS 147 (2005). 
 219. See WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 217. 
 220. 11 U.S.C. § 1104(e) (2006). 
 221. Id. § 1104(a)(3). 
 222. See WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 217, at 438. 
 223. See id. 
 224. See supra text accompanying notes 138-139; see also H.R. REP. NO. 595, at 6192 
(1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963 (“[V]ery often the creditors will be benefitted 
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But now, with large corporate debtors bringing in turnaround specialists, 
insider cooperation and assistance is a less pressing concern.  A study fo-
cusing on large corporate Chapter 11 filings in 2001 found that seventy 
percent of CEOs were replaced within the two years preceding the filing.225  
“This represents a sharp increase over comparable figures reported in pre-
vious studies and suggests strongly that Chapter 11 does not provide a safe 
harbor for entrenched managers.”226  Between 1990 and the early 2000s, 
CEO turnover rates in bankruptcy increased sixty-five percent.227  And, for 
entrenched managers, meaning those with significant equity holdings, the 
turnover rate increased by more than 200 percent.228  Including the two 
year post-filing period increases the proportion of CEOs replaced from se-
venty to eighty percent, although this is likely an underestimation because 
the researchers did not systematically collect post-petition data.229  These 
statistics suggest that debtors find that the incremental benefit of keeping 
existing management in place outweighed by the benefits of bringing in 
new management.  It follows that securing existing management’s coopera-
tion and assistance with the plan of reorganization is no longer, and may 
never have been, a valid reason for granting a release. 
In addition, the trend towards pre-packaged bankruptcies and 363 sales 
places insiders in a position adverse to that of creditors.  There is a heigh-
tened concern that insiders will not act in the best interests of creditors or 
the estate.  Creditors often prefer prearranged bankruptcies because the 
creditors are able to recover more quickly and they avoid the risk of any 
further decline in the company’s value.  Insiders, on the other hand, may 
prefer traditional Chapter 11 reorganizations because not only are they able 
to keep their jobs, but they stand to benefit further if the company is able to 
rebound over the course of the reorganization.  Insiders may act out of self-
interest in guiding the debtor into a traditional reorganization and bypass a 
more efficient and effective pre-arranged bankruptcy.  The misalignment of 
insiders’ and creditors’ interests provides yet another reason not to grant 
releases and injunctions to insiders. 
 
by continuation of the debtor-in-possession, both because the expense of a trustee will not 
be required, and the debtor, who is familiar with his business, will be better able to operate it 
during the reorganization case.”). 
 225. Kenneth M. Ayotte & Edward R. Morrison, Creditor Control and Conflict in Chap-
ter 11, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 511, 513 (2009). 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. at 516. 
 228. Id. at 516. 
 229. Id. at 552.  Ayotte and Morrison attribute this change to increased control of bank-
ruptcies by creditors. Id. at 516. 
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2. Shift Towards Pre-Arranged Bankruptcies and Use of Turnaround 
Management Renders the Contributing Nondebtor Justification for Insider 
Releases and Injunctions Moot 
Another reason asserted by courts and scholars for granting insiders re-
leases is the contributing nondebtor theory—the idea that insiders should 
be granted releases in exchange for substantial monetary contribution to the 
plan.230  This justification is weak for several reasons. 
First, part of the traditional justification for the contributing nondebtor 
theory is to give insiders an equity interest in the company that would en-
courage the insiders to make the reorganized company as successful as 
possible.  As recent statistics demonstrate, however, large corporations are 
not retaining old management, so the need to obtain this incentive structure 
is no longer a viable justification for releasing an insider. 
Second, there have always been concerns that the amount of the mone-
tary contribution did not support a full release of all personal liability, and 
in response, some courts showed reluctance to accept this justification.231  
The court risks releasing an insider from liability that far exceeds the 
amount of the monetary contribution to the plan.  If the debtor is jointly li-
able with the insider, the debtor is then faced with potentially footing the 
bill for claimants who are enjoined from asserting claims against the insid-
er. 
Related to this second point is the idea that an insider’s willingness to 
contribute to a plan of reorganization is not a reliable measure of a compa-
ny’s going concern value, and as discussed previously, a goal of bankrupt-
cy is to rehabilitate only those companies with going concern value and to 
liquidate the rest.232  Insiders’ willingness to commit their own funds is not 
a good measure of going concern value because an insider’s judgment may 
be clouded by sentimental reasons that do not comport with the actual via-
bility of the company, including the desire to save jobs, an admirable but 
potentially unrealistic goal.  This is particularly prevalent in Chapter 11 fil-
ings of smaller companies.  It may be better for creditors of these smaller 
debtors to allow the company to be liquidated and go after the insider per-
sonally for the balance of their unpaid claims, for example, if the insider 
guaranteed the companies debt.  More importantly, the insider is essentially 
 
 230. See supra text accompanying notes 140-141. 
 231. Consider the example of A. H. Robins, where the Robins family received American 
Home Products stock worth $385 million as a tax-free distribution on their A. H. Robins 
stock under the reorganization plan in exchange for a mere $10 million contribution to the 
plan; but, the Fourth Circuit subsequently found this amount not to be “substantial.” See su-
pra notes 106-107, 110 and accompanying text. 
 232. See supra text accompanying notes 18-21. 
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buying her freedom from personal liability, so the price she is willing to 
pay may not accurately reflect the likelihood that the company will succeed 
as a going concern. 
3. Need to Obtain Releases from Indemnity and Contribution Claims is 
an Illusory Justification for Granting Insider Releases and Injunctions 
As discussed earlier in this Note, commentators have aptly addressed the 
many obstacles facing an insider seeking to obtain indemnification or con-
tribution from the debtor.233  As these commentators suggest, the debtor is 
no better off when it grants releases to insiders in exchange for obtaining a 
release from indemnification or contribution claims by the insider.  The 
reason is that the debtor is only liable for a small number of allowed claims 
on which it is a co-obligor, and even for those, the insider simply pays the 
creditor and becomes a general unsecured creditor.234 
4. Two Caveats to Refusing Releases and Injunctions to Insiders: 
Temporary Stays and Consensual Releases 
As discussed in Part I, courts often temporarily enjoin creditors from as-
serting claims against individual officers, directors, and employees until the 
plan is confirmed when claims would take insiders’ time and energy away 
from focusing on the reorganization, and “in order to fully effectuate the 
breathing spell from creditor actions that the automatic stay seeks to afford 
the debtor.”235  A bankruptcy court may use its equitable powers to impose 
a temporary nondebtor stay to the extent the stay will aid in the reorganiza-
tion and ensure fair and equitable distribution to creditors.  The Supreme 
Court implicitly sanctioned temporary nondebtor stays in Celotex Corp. v. 
Edwards.236 
Temporary stays may in fact benefit the debtor and creditors, because 
the debtor’s indemnification or contribution obligations are discharged 
upon confirmation of the plan.237  If the insider is found liable after the plan 
is confirmed, he or she is foreclosed from seeking contribution or indemni-
fication from the debtor.  For this reason, courts should be especially will-
ing to grant temporary stays to insiders. 
 
 233. See supra text accompanying notes 143-152. 
 234. Id. 
 235. Brubaker, Bankruptcy Injunctions, supra note 77, at 970, 970 n.42 (section 
362(c)(2)(C) states that a “stay terminates upon grant of discharge in Chapter 11 case”). 
 236. 514 U.S 300 (1995). 
 237. See 11 U.S.C. § 502(e)(1)(B) (2006). 
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Additionally, when a release or injunction is consensual, the bankruptcy 
court need not stand in the way.238  This enables the creditors to exercise 
their own discretion over what is in their best interests, without dragging 
the bankruptcy court into the debate.239 
CONCLUSION 
Although bankruptcy courts do have the authority to approve Chapter 11 
plans that contain nondebtor releases and injunctions, this power should be 
exercised only under extraordinary circumstances. 
If a debtor is faced with mass tort or class action litigation that threatens 
to upend any attempt at reorganization, a debtor’s insurers may be released 
from liability, but only if three conditions are met.  First, there must be a 
substantial risk that the proceeds the insurer is obligated to pay under the 
policy will not cover the claims.  Second, the insurer must contribute more 
value than it is otherwise obligated to provide under the terms of the insur-
ance agreement.  Third, the insurer must contribute the funds to a claimants 
trust that segregates them from those available to the general pool of credi-
tors so that the ability of the victims of the mass tort or securities fraud to 
recover on their claims is not disturbed by the overreaching of other credi-
tors. 
Public policy considerations and recent changes in the process by which 
debtors attempt to reorganize weigh against granting insiders permanent 
injunctions or releases.  The increased utilization of prearranged bankrupt-
 
 238. See Starr, supra note 137, at 501 (“When an insider release is a consensual provi-
sion, which a creditor may freely accept or reject, it is no different than any other settlement 
and does not implicate section 524(e).  The bankruptcy court simply exercises its umbrella 
jurisdiction over the tripartite settlement among the insiders, the debtor, and the creditors.  
The benefit-burden principle is respected because the insiders must offer sufficient induce-
ment to creditors to achieve settlement, while retaining the risk of claims by objectors.  The 
moral hazard is eliminated because the insiders are not protected from the consequences of 
prepetition acts by the ability to use the Code to force a discounted settlement on unwilling 
creditors.  Experience shows that the prospect of voluntary releases can be sufficient in-
ducement for settlement and that such settlements fairly serve the interests of all parties . . . 
in the reorganization.”). 
 239. See, e.g., In re AOV Indus., Inc., 31 B.R. 1005, 1008-09 (D.D.C. 1983), aff’d in 
part, rev’d in part, 792 F.2d 1140 (D.C. Cir.), vacated in part, 797 F.2d 1004 (D.C. Cir. 
1986) (reorganization plan was funded by the two largest creditors who made funds availa-
ble to other creditors who would grant them a release.  No discharge was realized because 
the creditors were free to reject the funds and maintain their claims.); In re Monroe Well 
Serv. Inc., 80 B.R. 324, 329 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987) (explaining benefits to all parties from 
plan providing for voluntary releases); Starr, supra note 137, at 500 (noting that insider re-
leases given by creditors in exchange for consideration, where objecting creditors have the 
opportunity to opt out, can effectively serve the interests of all parties involved in a reorgan-
ization without expanding the discharge power beyond the limits of its legislative grant). 
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cies negates the need for insider assistance and cooperation since the plan 
is arranged prior to the debtor filing the Chapter 11 petition.  The use of 
turnaround management and the replacement of insiders either prior to or 
following the Chapter 11 filing indicate that large corporations do not see a 
need to induce insiders to remain with the company by granting insiders re-
leases in exchange for the contribution of new value.  Lastly, this Note ar-
gues that commentators have been correct in asserting that the need to ob-
tain releases from insiders for indemnity or contribution claims against the 
debtor is an illusory justification.  On the other hand, temporary as opposed 
to permanent stays for insiders are largely unproblematic.  Finally, bank-
ruptcy courts may grant permanent releases or injunctions to insiders when 
creditors give their consent. 
